When did Strategy become a sub-genre of Fantasy?
New Zealand’s digital strategy has goals disconnected from actions disconnected from consequences
The Digital Strategy for Aotearoa, as released in September 2022, got me thinking about the term “strategy”, and how it has come to mean different things in different spheres. While I think the term is quite well-defined in the field of economics, business and the military, the strategies produced by New Zealand’s governments appear increasingly disconnected from these other conceptions.
Strategy in economics
A “strategy”, according to game theory, means the best path of action given what you know, including your anticipations of the best paths of actions of other actors.
A useful sub-category is the dominant strategy — one that’s your best course of action regardless of what other actors (or specifically, your opponents) choose to do. Relatively few strategies are dominant — the remainder need to predict the behaviour of other actors. Understanding the incentives they face and the information they have available can improve the reliability of those predictions.
Further, a strategy inevitably makes assumptions about the future. Its proposed actions are implicitly the best available should the future not diverge too far from those predictions. A useful strategy anticipates changed circumstances and the arrival of new information.
What is a Strategy, more generally?
Wikipedia offers a reasonably uncontroversial definition:
Strategy (from Greek στρατηγία stratēgia, "art of troop leader; office of general, command, generalship") is a general plan to achieve one or more long-term or overall goals under conditions of uncertainty.
Strategy is important because the resources available to achieve goals are usually limited. Strategy generally involves setting goals and priorities, determining actions to achieve the goals, and mobilizing resources to execute the actions. A strategy describes how the ends (goals) will be achieved by the means (resources).1
Strategies sits above tactics, and are more flexible than plans.2
Military strategy
The word strategy comes from the military. The world is unlucky enough to have a recent example of what can go wrong when strategy becomes disconnected from reality. A recent New York Times article details where Putin’s strategy for the invasion of Ukraine went wrong.3 Basically, the strategy over-estimated the resources and competence of Russian forces, while under-estimating the Ukrainian ones. It provided for no contingencies other than swift military success followed by complete capitulation of the Ukrainian populace.
A failed strategy leading to strategic and geopolitical mess. As Noah Smith puts it:
Russia has gotten the worst of almost all of the exchanges in the war so far, showing that its military is qualitatively inferior to Ukraine’s (much less NATO’s). That failure has exposed Russia’s weakness as a great power, technologically, militarily, and economically… The failure of the initial invasion pretty much assures that there will be a very hostile, militarily capable, Western-aligned Ukraine on Russia’s borders for the foreseeable future. Strategically, this was a pretty big disaster for Russia.
Strategy in business
Business strategy is yet another discipline. But, in common with economics and the military, for something to be a useful strategy, it needs a clear statement of:
Goals and timeframes for their achievement
Actions, that are logically connected to achievement of those goals
A plan of what actions to be undertaken by whom and in what timeframe
Assumptions made about the external environment
Monitoring to assess the continuing validity of the assumptions, and progress towards achieving the goals
Consideration of alternative plans if the assumptions do not hold in practice.
Strategy in government
Governments produce large quantities of policy documents with a wide variety of labels. Those labelled strategies sit towards the top of a hierarchy, purporting to connect and coordinate goals and actions across different parts of government and, in many cases, the nation. The quality of strategies, and the extent to which they are followed or ignored, matters for the performance of governments and countries. As with Russia’s recent military strategy missteps, bad strategy can have catastrophic consequences for a country.
That said, let’s examine a recent contribution to the government strategy genre.
Digital goals for an alternative universe
The overarching goal of the digital strategy4 is vague but ambitious:
Enabling Aotearoa New Zealand’s people, communities, economy, and environment to flourish and prosper in the digital era.
The statement of vision for 2032 is wide-sweeping and goes far beyond the digital realm, offering equity, innovation, resilience, sustainability, a strong economy and more.
Aotearoa New Zealand is a more equitable, innovative place with a healthy democracy and a strong economy. Our country is resilient, sustainable, and ready for the future.
The strategy’s goals are written in terms of “all New Zealanders” and “all New Zealand businesses”. The “measures of success” are to be achieved by 2032.
It beggars belief that any national digital strategy could fulfil this vision, and meet these goals and measures of success.
The digital world is global, not local
The internet is world-wide, connecting every country. Online environments, unlike countries, have no borders. A single country cannot both be connected to the wider internet, and make and enforce rules that might keep its citizens “safe and empowered in online environments”.
There is only one known alternative arrangement, exemplified by China’s so-called Great Firewall. This segments the online world into a regulated (i.e. censored, restricted and monitored) Chinese net and the wider internet, with a clearly defined (and heavily regulated) boundary between the two. The Great Firewall is very costly to implement and maintain, and does not always succeed at social control.
The strategy neither mentions nor contemplates a Great Kiwi Firewall. And even that would in reality be in conflict with other goals, for example, increasing digital exports and meeting people’s diverse needs. Those goals will necessarily involve connecting with people outside the country, and using digital platforms, tools and services hosted elsewhere.
The strategy provides no feasible mechanism to achieve it goal that “all New Zealanders feel safe and supported online”, yet it unashamedly presents that as part of an achievable vision for 2032.
Neither does it have a mechanism to provide all New Zealanders a “verified digital identity” usable across the internet.
Diversity extends to the ambitions and preferences of New Zealanders
“Tools, skills and confidence” are not something the government can bestow on every New Zealander. Not all are interested in making the required levels of personal investment. This is not a choice for governments to make, at least not in a way compatible with a “healthy democracy”.
Resources are limited
“All New Zealanders can afford a quality internet connection and internet enabled device” is a social and economic goal — but one that comes at a cost. Similarly, “our digital and data infrastructures are fit-for-purpose and secure” and making “high-speed internet … available to all New Zealanders” are likely costly goals. How costly? The strategy doesn’t tell us. Nor does it specify priorities — what goals will (or should) be pre-eminent in a universe that lacks infinite resources.
Moreover, the strategy appears to be driven by a confusion as to the value of things like a “quality internet connection”. Just because these are extremely valuable to some, and valuable on average, does not mean they have positive value to every individual. Indeed, at least some people may holdout because they assess that the costs of adoption, for them, outweigh the benefits to them. What resources should the state expend trying to supply things to those who do not want them? Or trying to persuade them otherwise?
Where cause and effect do not apply
Incompatible goals, missing mechanisms, and tradeoffs are presumably not a problem in all universes. Authors of fantasy novels get to choose the physical and metaphysical rules that apply in their universe.
The Digital Strategy author’s voice is that of a dictator, who gets to specify pretty much everything. For example:
Central government must work towards digital inclusion alongside iwi, Māori, businesses, other groups at higher risk of digital exclusion such as Pacific peoples, older, disabled and migrant communities, and organisations. Organisations must collect, store, and use data in ethical, lawful, culturally appropriate ways, following suitable rules. People who develop or publish digital content must make sure it meets accessibility and universal design standards. [Emphasis added.]
Back in our universe, cause and effect apply. A statement that people or organisations must do something needs a mechanism for implementation. The strategy provides no mechanism (e.g. laws with effective enforcement) that could plausibly cause these effects in a local context, let alone the global one.
Even more scarily, the strategy presumes to specify the motivations of the whole population.
Everyone should have the motivation, access, skills, and trust to use digital tools and technologies in ways that work for them. [Emphasis added.]
I don’t even want to think about government mechanisms to achieve this should.
Strategy is a powerful tool
The Digital Strategy is written as if the strategy it describes in dominant, that is, its success is guaranteed without consideration of the actions of others, changed circumstances and new information.
Moreover the Strategy’s authors appear to believe that the right strategy has the power to do a lot of good. But it’s a small logical step from there to acknowledging that the wrong strategy has the power to do a lot of harm. As every fantasy novelist tells, those invoking powerful tools should take the utmost care to distinguish right from wrong.
Strategy is best kept separate from Fantasy
I’m a fan of the fantasy genre. I enjoy immersing myself in authors’ worlds with different rules. But it needs to be kept well separate from reality.
The digital world is fast-moving, scary and uncertain. It is also global. New Zealand is a small country, and inevitably will remain more taker than maker of digital technologies, products, services and regulation. Yes, there are sensible things that governments can do to make this a bit smoother, safer and productive for New Zealanders. But there are binding limits to the power of governments, and of the strategies they write.5 We are better served when these do not stray into fantasy.
By Dave Heatley
Thanks to Olivia Wills for very useful comments on an earlier draft.
Wikipedia contributors. (2022, November 26). Strategy. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 23:59, December 14, 2022.
A strategy, for example, could outline a menu of tactics, and the circumstances under which they would or would not be applied. A strategy differs from a plan, in that the former is more long-term and deals with higher degrees of uncertainty.
This post draws on examples from the Digital Strategy. That said, it is by no means the only recent government strategy to exhibit these faults. The problem, as I see it, is a generic one for the New Zealand Government, not limited to digital issues or to those responsible for the Digital Strategy.
A useful test to apply in economic analysis is to ask “if I can’t see the value in X, but other people are choosing to supply and purchase it, then what can they see that I am missing?” (This test goes by many names, one of which is Chesterton's fence.) Applying this test, what is it about the political economy of the public service and government that makes a fantastical strategy more valuable than a grounded one? Or over having no strategy at all? Does it cover off a specific political risk? Is it costly signaling behavior? Or something else? I invite your thoughts.